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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the indirect impacts of Boko Haram on the Logone floodplain in the Far 
North Region of Cameroon. While the direct threat of Boko Haram attacks remains low on the 
Logone floodplain, residents face new economic pressures related to the disruption of the 
Northeast Nigerian economy and increased military activity in the region. This study aims to 
quantify the magnitude of these economic impacts on floodplain residents; identify which groups 
are most vulnerable to the current crisis; and determine whether or not the short-term disruption 
facilitated by Boko Haram could precipitate long-term changes to social and economic trends on 
the floodplain. In order to answer these questions, I present an agent-based model that simulates 
the economic and demographic behaviors of households on the floodplain. After testing the effects 
of nine different economic crises on the floodplain model, I conclude that the floodplain system is 
resilient to the short-term economic disturbance caused by Boko Haram. The simulations also 
provide valuable insights about the relative vulnerability of different household sub-populations, 
the possible short-term effects of the crisis, and the effect of family size on changes in household 
wealth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2012, Boko Haram has killed thousands of people in Northeast Nigeria and in the border  
regions of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The growing body of reportage, strategic analysis, and 
academic literature on Boko Haram tends to focus on the endogenous development of the group 
itself (Cook 2014; Agbiboa 2013), as well as the direct impact of Boko Haram in the regions where 
it is currently active (Nfor 2015). However, in addition to areas where they are currently active, 
Boko Haram has exerted indirect pressures in surrounding areas due to the closure of the Nigerian 
markets and an increased military presence leading to intensified taxation and restrictions on 
mobility and economic activity. Efforts to manage and restore the region once Boko Haram is gone 
must account not only for the direct damage caused by the group, but also the long-term indirect 
impact on the entire region. 
 
This thesis considers Boko Haram’s effect on fishermen in the Logone floodplain in the Far North 
Region of Cameroon. The floodplain is a social-ecological system that was already undergoing 
rapid changes in the years before the rise of Boko Haram. Now, Boko Haram’s presence in 
Cameroon, along with the subsequent reactions from local government and military forces, has 
exerted new and significant stresses on the floodplain that threaten to change it for decades to 
come. I will examine the indirect effects of Boko Haram, particularly the closing of the Nigerian 
border and its impact on fish prices, on floodplain households. Specifically, this study addresses 
the following questions: what is the magnitude of the pressure placed on floodplain households as 
a result of Boko Haram? Which households or groups on the floodplain will experience the 
strongest adverse effects? Finally, could this short-term pressure facilitate a shift in the floodplain 
system that outlasts the disturbance itself, permanently changing residents’ behavior and 
livelihoods? 
 
The remainder of this introduction provides historical and theoretical context for the current crisis 
on the Logone floodplain. I discuss how historical factors contributed to the floodplain’s shifting 
social and economic dynamics in the lead-up to the Boko Haram crisis. I then introduce the 
concepts of complexity, resilience, and vulnerability as theoretical tools for understanding the 
long-term effects of disturbances on the floodplain. I discuss how Boko Haram has placed indirect 
pressures on floodplain residents and the potential threat of those pressures on the floodplain 
system. 
 
In the Methods section, I discuss agent-based modeling as a tool to understand demographic and 
economic changes. I introduce the agent-based model used in this study, which links economic 
activity and demographic changes within floodplain households. I then describe the experiment 
used to simulate the potential impacts of Boko Haram on the floodplain. Finally, in the Results 
and Discussion sections, I discuss the results of the experiments and their implications for the 
economic prospects of floodplain residents.  
 
 
1.1 The Logone Floodplain 
 
The Logone floodplain is one of the major floodplains in the Lake Chad hydrological system 
(Lemoalle 2005), and is one of the largest and most fertile floodplains in Sahelian West Africa 
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(Drijver et al 1995: 30). Located in the Far North Region of Cameroon, it derives its name from 
the Logone river, which forms the boundary between Cameroon and Chad, and Waza National 
Park. Morphologically, the floodplain is characterized by extreme flatness; the only raised areas 
on the floodplain are human-made mounds upon which people build their houses and the banks of 
the rivers (Delclaux et al 2010). 
 
Under typical climactic and weather conditions, the plain is flooded by the Logone river once a 
year, beginning in late August or September. During the three to four months of annual flooding, 
water on the plain can reach depths of up to two meters (Lemoalle 2005). By December, most of 
the water recedes into the Logone River and the El Bëid River, leaving only a few isolated 
depressions filled with water (Fernandez et al forthcoming). Over subsequent months, these 
depressions become smaller and swamp-like before disappearing due to evaporation (Acreman et 
al 2004: 63). 
 
The inundation of the floodwaters serves as a rich nursery for a variety of vegetation and fish 
species (Lemoalle 2005). The floods deposit rich sediment onto the floodplain and support the 
development of vegetation; then, facilitated by a combination of available nutrients and habitat, 
the floodplain attracts spawning fish. By the middle of the twentieth century, the Logone 
floodplain was reputed to be “one of the richest fish-producing inland waters of Africa” (Drijver 
et al 1995: 30). The floodplain’s richness in both vegetation and fish is the basis of the local 
economy; however, its ability to sustain fish stocks, and therefore support a local community, is 
in turn based off of the extent of the flooding. In this way, the hydrologic, ecological, and social-
economic systems of the floodplain are closely linked (Laborde et al forthcoming). 
 
Local people make a living on the floodplain through a variety of activities. People plant floating 
rice during the early inundation period, fish on the rivers and in man-made canals during the late 
flooding season, and plant crops in the fertile soil or raise livestock that graze on the indigenous 
vegetation during the dry season (Drijver et al 1995: 30-31). While certain groups specialize in 
just one activity, others are generalists: “during the same season, the local populations are 
alternatively or simultaneously fishers, herders, and farmers, and each part of the floodplains is 
potentially a fishing ground, a grazing area and a cultured field, depending on the period in the 
flood cycle” (Béné 2003: 188). 
 
While pastoralists from Fulani and Shuwa Arab ethnic groups bring their herds to graze on the 
floodplain during the dry season, they cannot live in the Logone floodplain all year, as the pastures 
are inundated during the flooding season (Delclaux et al 2010). My thesis will primarily examine 
Boko Haram’s potential impact on two ethnic groups, the Kotoko and the Musgum, who fish or 
farm on the floodplain year-round (Béné 2003). While the Kotoko have been fishing on the 
floodplain for centuries, the Musgum are a group of traditional farmers who arrived on the plain 
more recently (Acreman et al 2004: 55). The following section will briefly discuss the history of 
the two groups on the floodplain and its relationship to the changing social and economic dynamics 
on the floodplain. 
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1.2 Historical Context 
 
The Kotoko trace their history on the floodplain back to the 15th century (Drijver et al 1995: 32). 
While evidence suggests that their ethnic group originally practiced pastoralism, they quickly 
switched to fishing as their primary economic activity after arriving on the floodplain (Acreman 
et al 2004: 55). The Musgum began to appear on the floodplain in the late 19th century. In many 
ways, the changing relationship between the Kotoko and Musgum is a microcosm of larger events 
in Cameroonian history. For example, the first streams of Musgum onto the floodplain from plains 
coincided with the advent of the French-British “colonial peace” (Seignobos and Fabien 2003). 
 
The Kotoko originally allowed the Musgum to live on small, uninhabited islands in the floodplain 
under strict conditions (Acreman et al 2004: 62). However, a new wave of Musgum migrants came 
from the south following Cameroonian independence in the 1960s, and governance of the new 
group became much more fraught. Interviews with floodplain residents1 suggested that this wave 
of migrants was seeking refuge from the Sultan of Pouss, who had begun to terrorize villages after 
they had refused to vote for his preferred candidate in the first post-independence elections. An 
older Musgum man recalled people having their property confiscated, being put into forced labor, 
and their village being burned to the ground. With the influx of new Musgum migrants, the 
traditional laws of the Kotoko became increasingly difficult to enforce. 
 
Until the 1970s, consistent farming and fishing yields and a relatively small floodplain population 
kept conflicts and poverty on the Logone floodplain to a minimum; however, this was disrupted 
by drought and the implementation of a national rice-growing scheme directly to the south of the 
floodplain. Under the auspices of the Cameroonian national government, a state-owned company 
called SEMRY (“Societe d’Expansion et de Modernisation de Riziculture de Yagoua”) dammed 
the area to create an artificial lake known today as Lake Maga (Delclaux et al 2010). The lake 
drew significant amounts of water from the Logone River, limiting the river’s annual flooding 
capacity further downstream. To prevent the rice projects from being flooded, SEMRY also built 
a dike along the Logone River that extended kilometers downstream. The effects of the SEMRY 
project had reduced the annual extent of the floodwaters by up to 30 percent (Acreman et al 2004: 
7). Several drought years in the 1980s exacerbated this problem, creating a time of scarcity when 
many households fell into poverty or were forced to leave the floodplain (Acreman et al 2004:23). 
After over a decade of privation, a reflooding effort led by the World Conservation Union began 
to restore the floodplain’s capacity. The reflooding project was completed, partially restoring the 
floodwaters to the Logone, by 2000 (Acreman et al 2004). 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all interview responses discussed in this study were 
transcribed from a focus group conducted by Sarah Laborde during November 2015 in Maroua, 
Cameroon. The four interviewees included Musgum, Kotoko, and Fulbe residents of the 
floodplain. This focus group is currently unpublished. 
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1.3 A Changing Social-Ecological System 
 
But while the floodwaters have returned to the Logone floodplain, the practices used by local 
groups to manage and derive wealth from the floodplain have gradually shifted. This section 
discusses changes in practice over time, setting the social-ecological context for studying the Boko 
Haram-induced disturbance that is the focus of this thesis.  
 
The practices in place at the turn of the 20th century were regulated by the Kotoko, and involved 
an assortment of restrictions and regulations based on tradition and social hierarchy that effectively 
maintained the floodplain’s ecological resources over time. For example, the Kotoko would only 
begin their fishing season after observing the ritual of moutwak, which involves spotting a late-
spawning fish in the water. This traditional ensures that most of the other fish species have 
completed their reproductive cycles and helps to maintain fish stocks over time (Drijver et al 1995: 
37). After the floodplain had receded, some fish remain trapped in nearby depressions; fishing in 
those depressions used to be a strictly communal activity that required approval of a local spiritual 
authority (Acreman et al 2004: 63). 
 
Fishing canals, known as irari in the Kotoko dialect, have received special attention due to their 
potential profitability as well as their impact on the hydrology of the floodplain. During the dry 
season, fishermen are able to dig canals in the floodplain that are 1-3 meters deep and up to several 
kilometers long (Laborde et al forthcoming). The canals can simply extend out into the floodplain, 
or they can end in a depression. When the floodwater recedes during the following flood season, 
fish are forced into the canal’s channel. Then, the canal owner simply has to place a barrier and a 
net around the end of his canal and wait to catch what can be, in a well-maintained and well-located 
canal, enormous amounts of fish. Of all the fishing techniques, the canal is the most productive by 
far (Drijver et al 1995: 36); however, Kotoko fishermen had to receive permission from a local 
authority to build a canal, which itself could only occur once a resident had reached a certain status 
within their village, so only a few households had the wealth and influence to do build and maintain 
canals. 
 
While these traditional regulations and restrictions were likely conceived in order to monopolize 
resources among the local Kotoko elite, they effectively managed the natural resources of the 
Logone floodplain for centuries (Drijver et al 1995: 37). In the heyday of the 1960s, fishers could 
earn the equivalent of up to 2,000 USD in a single season (quite a lot for the floodplain); meanwhile, 
the lucky few owners of fish canals could make four to five times as much money (Drijver et al 
1995: 36). 
 
For the first half of the twentieth century, when the Musgum were still a minority population on 
the floodplain, the Kotoko fishers placed strict restrictions on their ability to exploit wealth from 
the natural environment. For example, the Kotoko were allowed to fish with dragnets, while the 
Musgum were restricted to less-productive techniques such as fish-hooks (Landolt 2010). These 
restrictions were enforced by the Kotoko’s superior numbers and long-standing traditional 
institutions on the floodplain. Additionally, coming from an agricultural background, the Musgum 
simply lacked the technical knowledge for some of the more advanced fishing techniques (Landolt 
2010). 
 
7 
 
The arrival of new Musgum immigrants in the 1960s combined with the environmental change 
due to the Maga Dam and SEMRY dikes eroded the power of traditional Kotoko institutions. 
Throughout the 1980s, a 30% reduction in the flooding extent caused fishing revenues, agricultural 
yields, and the available of key natural products to plummet simultaneously (Delclaux et al 2010). 
Musgum residents then began to fish in new locations, at new times, and using new techniques 
that had been forbidden to them under Kotoko law. This caused an increase in conflicts between 
Musgum and Kotoko residents, leading to a further breakdown in the social order (Drijver et al 
1995). 
 
Today, the water has partially returned to the floodplain, but the social-ecological regime in both 
Musgum and Kotoko communities is still rapidly shifting. Fish canals, once a protected resource 
reserved for the lucky few, have spread across the floodplain in recent decades. A survey of canal 
locations and ages revealed that on a subsection of the floodplain, the number of fishing canals 
grew from 510 in 1980 to 1,172 in 2014. Because canals are now so prevalent, they are also 
individually less productive (Laborde et al forthcoming). Many depressions are now being drained 
by canals as the floodwaters recede, leaving no fish for community fishing in the dry season. 
Disagreements about community fishing resources and digging new canals have spurred conflicts, 
which can even spiral into violence: in 2007, a battle over Sifna Pond on the floodplain left 30 
dead (Delclaux et al 2010). Many people are concerned that the fishing canals are reducing the 
floodplain’s productivity overall, and their continued growth could cause a collapse in fish stocks. 
But despite this, fishing canals continue to increase exponentially in number across the floodplain 
(Laborde et al forthcoming). 
 
Resource management has been shifting in the last few decades from a strictly controlled regime 
to a “democratized,” individual regime. Fishing canals are growing at an increasing, potentially 
unsustainable rate. Tensions over fishing access and new canals have been slowly growing as fish 
catches begin to decrease. It is this already fraught historical, social, and environmental context 
that Boko Haram has further unsettled since 2013, indirectly disrupting the physical security, social 
relations, and economic well-being of practically everyone on the floodplain. 
 
Aspects of both continuity and sudden change are apparent in the recent history of the floodplain. 
While the in-migration of Musgum households, the decline of a Kotoko-dominated system of 
governance, and the rapid growth of fishing canals since the 1980s are all well-documented trends 
on the floodplain, it would be a mistake to assume that any of these shifts were inevitable. Equally 
important to this study is the role of rapid, dramatic changes in social and economic conditions on 
the floodplain, instigated by events such as the construction of the Maga Dam. Understanding how 
these sudden changes interplay with longer-term patterns is a crucial step towards understanding 
how Boko Haram might permanently alter the floodplain. To do so, a theoretical framework is 
needed. In the following section, I will discuss the concepts of complexity, resilience, and 
vulnerability, three concepts that can help to clarify Boko Haram’s potential impact on the 
floodplain. 
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1.4 Complexity, Resilience, and Vulnerability on the Floodplain 
 
One field of inquiry investigating the interplay between short-term changes and long-term shifts 
in behavior is that of complexity science. Complexity science studies systems where relatively 
simple rules for individual behavior or decision-making produces unintuitive, “emergent” 
properties at the system level (Wolfram 2002). The tenets of complexity can be applied to a diverse 
set of systems, and the Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) perspective applies aspects 
of complexity theory to human-environment interactions. CHANS can be defined as “integrated 
systems in which people interact with natural components” (Liu et al 2007: 1513). Common traits 
of CHANS include nonlinear processes; thresholds, or transition points between different states; 
surprising, sometimes detrimental, effects created by large-scale development or conservation 
policies; and legacy affects, in which human-natural couplings affect systems outcomes at a much 
later time (Liu et al 2007). Moritz et al argue that the Logone floodplain is well-suited to a CHANS 
approach because it can help to uncover potential regime shifts, in which a system moves from one 
sustained state (or regime) to another (Moritz et al 2016: 101). While the present study does not 
explicitly engage with human-environment interactions, it engages with similar concepts of 
couplings, also known as feedbacks; the concept of the threshold, discussed in more detail below, 
is also key to the current study. 
 
Laborde et al (forthcoming) also make use of a complexity perspective to better understand the 
exponential growth of canals in the Logone floodplain over time. Laborde et al trace this transition 
in floodplain dynamics back to a set of positive social-ecological feedbacks that incentivize 
individual fishermen to build and expand more and more canals over time. These feedbacks 
include behavioral feedbacks, where fishermen hold out hope for a more productive catch next 
season, or where the canal becomes an important part of their identity; socio-economic feedbacks 
such as the development of a fish-commerce channel to Nigeria in parallel to the growth of canal 
fishing; and a hydrological feedback, where more canals on the floodplain reduce the flooding 
time, making non-canal fishing techniques less effective. Laborde et al suggest that these 
feedbacks might be altered to promote the growth of different, more sustainable techniques in the 
future. Finding new strategies for resource management on the floodplain is a critical endeavor, as 
the floodplain may already be in “overshoot,” locked-in to a technology that the social-ecological 
system cannot sustain (Laborde et al 2010). 
 
While feedback loops can help to explain long-term trends in the Logone fishery system, the 
system cannot be fully understood without considering how those trends relate to crises and other 
short-term, dramatic changes on the floodplain. This relationship can be explored using two key 
concepts within the literature on disaster response in complex systems: resilience and vulnerability. 
 
Resilience describes the ability of a system to recover from disturbances and return to its original 
state (Cutter et al 2008: 599). A resilience perspective conceptualizes complex systems as existing 
on a “stability landscape” that tends to attract systems towards certain dynamic equilibria based 
on their current state (Gallopin 2006: 298). Using the metaphor of a ball being drawn into an 
indentation in the ground based on its current position and the slope of the ground, this perspective 
imagines “basins of attraction” in the stability landscape as ranges of conditions under which a 
system (the ball) will be drawn towards the dynamic equilibrium (the indentation). If a system is 
disturbed by a long-term shock, its behavior can generally change in one of two ways: either the 
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system will remain in the same basin of attraction, pulling it back towards the original stable state, 
or it will be pushed into a different basin of attraction, which will draw it towards a different 
equilibrium state over the long term (Walker et al 2004). The point at which the system moves 
from one basin of attraction into another, changing its long-term behavior, is known as the 
threshold (Gallopin 2006: 298). In other words, resilience describes whether the system will 
remain within its original basin of attraction after a disturbance, or whether that disturbance will 
move the system into another basin of attraction, changing the system’s long-term equilibrium 
state. Key aspects of the system’s resilience include latitude, the maximum degree to which a 
system can be changed before losing its ability to recover; resistance, the ease or difficulty of 
changing the system; precariousness, how close the system is to the threshold before the 
disturbance; and panarchy, the effect of cross-scale interactions and feedbacks on the system state 
(Walker et al 2004; Cutter et al 2008: 601). 
 
Vulnerability is a complementary method for conceptualizing response to disruptions. If resilience 
describes a system’s ability to recover from disturbance, then vulnerability describes susceptibility 
to harm from a disturbance (Adger 2006: 268). While resilience is a holistic trait of complex 
systems, vulnerability can be investigated at different scales, from individuals and households to 
entire cities and nations (Smit and Wandel 2006: 282-283). Two key components of vulnerability 
research are pertinent to this study: first, exposure assesses the preexisting conditions that make 
people and systems sensitive to hazards (Cutter et al 2003). In response to a hazard, adaptive 
capacity describes the processes within a system that allow it to better adjust to or manage 
changing conditions (Smit and Wandel 2006: 282). The long-term goals of vulnerability research 
include identifying the most important variables in “a causal chain of vulnerability” to specific 
stressors (Adger 2006: 273), as well as merging the fields of vulnerability and resilience to create 
more holistic measures of system responses to disturbances (Smit and Wandel 2006: 289). 
 
Previous research (Moritz et al 2016; Laborde et al forthcoming) suggests that the Logone 
floodplain is a nonlinear dynamical system suitable for resilience and vulnerability analysis 
(Gallopin 2006: 299). In resilience terms, we can understand the construction of the Maga Dam as 
a stressor that pushed the floodplain system from one basin of attraction, in which communal canal 
and river fishing were primary economic activities, to another basin, in which individual fishing 
canals have grown exponentially over time. It is important to recognize that this change is due to 
both long-term internal pressures within the Logone floodplain, such as in-migration of Musgum 
households, as well as the “external” disturbance of the dam. In-migration increased the 
precariousness of the system before the dam pushed it past the threshold. 
 
A resilience perspective also lends itself to questions about the current state of the floodplain 
system. How precarious is the current system, and how resistant is it to current disturbances caused 
by Boko Haram? Can Boko Haram move the system towards a different basin of attraction that 
once again changes social, economic, and ecological systems on the floodplain? Are there any 
positive or negative feedbacks that will amplify or dampen the effect of these shocks on floodplain 
residents? Vulnerability analysis, with its emphasis on individual as well as systemic outcomes, 
can also inform the current investigation. Which individuals or groups are most vulnerable to 
dramatic changes on the floodplain, and why? Now that the disturbances are in effect, what 
behaviors are people and groups adopting to manage the effects of Boko Haram? In the following 
10 
 
sections, I will discuss how Boko Haram’s presence has instigated a number of short-term stressors 
on the system, then present the specific questions addressed by this study. 
 
 
1.5 The Indirect Threat of Boko Haram on the Logone Floodplain 
 
Boko Haram, whose name may be translated to “Western Education is Forbidden” (Agbiboa 2013: 
145), publicly emerged in Northwestern Nigeria around 2002, led by a charismatic Salafist 
preacher named Mohammed Yusuf (Rogers 2012:1). The group’s identity originally revolved 
around theology and a rejection of colonial influences, particularly Western-style education, in 
Nigerian culture. Boko Haram became significantly more militant in 2009, when the Nigerian 
military destroyed the group’s headquarters and killed Mohammed Yusuf (Rogers 2012: 1). The 
next year, Boko Haram’s remaining leaders organized a prison-break for its captured members; 
then, starting in 2011 and 2012, the group began carrying out large-scale attacks on civilians in 
Northeast Nigeria (Cold-Ravnkilde and Signe 2015: 21-22). 
 
In recent years, Boko Haram’s operations have expanded to include the other countries 
surrounding Northeast Nigeria: Cameroon, Niger, and Chad (Cold-Ravnkilde and Signe 2015: 23). 
Since the beginning of 2015, Boko Haram has killed more than 200 people in the Far North Region 
of Cameroon alone, primarily through bombing attacks on markets and public gathering-places 
(CrisisWatch). In response, the Nigerian, Chadian, and Cameroonian militaries have all mobilized 
against the group. The Nigerian-Cameroonian border is closed, while Chad’s border with the Far 
North Region of Cameroon is under strict military control (Adams 2014; Salatou 2015). The 
Cameroonian government has also banned gatherings of more than seven people in the Far North 
Region in an effort to limit potential Boko Haram attacks, effectively banning open-air markets 
(Kindzeka 2016). While the floodplain has not yet been subjected to direct violence as the result 
of Boko Haram, the group’s activities have indirectly impacted the floodplain through disruption 
of the Northeast Nigerian economy as well as the government-mandated security measures. I 
discuss these impacts in detail below. 
 
Through lootings, direct attacks, and market bombings, Boko Haram has severely disrupted the 
economy of Northeastern Nigeria, displacing more than 2 million people and creating the 
conditions for a regional hunger crisis (Searcey 2016; Nfor 2015). A 2014 survey showed that 
more than half of fishers on the Logone floodplain had been selling fish to Nigerian traders; the 
sharp drop in demand from Nigeria, compounded with the closing of the Nigerian-Cameroonian 
border in late 2014, have depressed fish prices on the floodplain (Adams 2014). Additionally, the 
closed border has raised prices for fuel and food goods that used to be imported into Northern 
Cameroon from Nigeria; for example, within five months of the border closing, the price of sugar 
increased by 50 percent (Kindzeka 2014; Nfor 2015). As a result, floodplain residents can no 
longer make as much money selling their food products at market, and other foods from outside 
are now significantly more expensive. 
 
The presence of new authorities on the floodplain have created new difficulties and expenses for 
residents, epitomized by the dispute over the Logone River. The Logone is not only the source for 
the annual floods on the region, it is also the national boundary between Chad and the Far North 
Region of Cameroon, as well as an important travel corridor that many residents to access local 
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markets. In October 2015, the Chadian military took control of the Logone River and prohibited 
residents from traveling on or across it to prevent Boko Haram from entering Chad and reaching 
N’Djamena, the capital, by the river. According to an interview of floodplain residents conducted 
in November 2015, many people living on the shore of the Logone have assets on both the Chadian 
and Cameroonian sides of the river, such as their house, rice fields, or fishing canals. When the 
Chadian military prohibited travel across the river, these residents lost their investments. 
Additionally, residents who originally traveled on the Logone now have to find alternate routes to 
major towns in the area, for example through seasonal rivers and fishing canals, sometimes paying 
expensive tolls to do so. According to interviewees, some residents still attempt to travel on the 
Logone at night, but those who are caught face hefty fines (Salatou 2015). These taxes are only 
one example; in a 2016 survey, respondents identified five different institutions that had levied 
new taxes in the past year alone. 
 
In addition to food insecurity, movement restrictions, and new taxes on the floodplain, many 
residents are living in fear of physical violence from both Boko Haram and the armies supposedly 
fighting them. One interviewee discussed how he felt safe from Boko Haram during the wet season, 
but when the dry season came, Boko Haram fighters could easily reach their village by motorbike. 
Another interviewee mentioned that he had been harassed by the Cameroonian military at a local 
market, even though he had his ID and all of the proper licenses. Others have fared much worse. 
Amnesty International accuses the Cameroonian military of unlawfully detaining political 
opponents in the Far North Region under the guise of counter-terrorism activities (Amnesty 
International 2013); and in late October 2015, the Chadian military sparked uproar by killing a 
local Cameroonian fisherman (Kazé 2015). As one interviewee put it, “we continue to live, but we 
have the fear in our bellies.” 
 
Although most floodplain residents have been insulated from Boko Haram’s attacks, the group’s 
presence and the subsequent military response have placed very real burdens on floodplain 
residents. Floodplain residents now face more obstacles to selling their goods in markets, receive 
less income for the products they do sell, pay higher prices for their basic necessities, and face a 
proliferation of new taxes. It is possible that floodplain residents have not seen a threat to their 
livelihoods of this magnitude since the Maga Dam was constructed in 1979. If so, these pressures 
might facilitate a shift in the coupled human and natural system that outlast the disturbance itself, 
similarly to the regime shift that is currently taking place on the floodplain. 
 
In the following sections, I explore Boko Haram’s short- and long-term effects with a quantitative 
model of fisher households on the Logone floodplain. This model presents a simplified picture of 
family dynamics and economic activity on the floodplain from 1978 to 2014, with an emphasis on 
the feedbacks between demography and wealth. I then conduct in silico experiments to determine 
how disturbances to household income change the long-term economic well-being of floodplain 
residents. While no model can capture the full array of multi-scalar processes governing the 
floodplain, this model will be useful for quantifying and comparing the long-term effects of 
different types of disturbances on both individual households and the floodplain economy as a 
whole. 
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2. Methods 
 
2.1 Modeling the Economic-Demographic Relationship 
 
This thesis aims to simulate changes in socio-economic variables in the Logone Floodplain during 
and after the disturbance of Boko Haram. Given the complexity of the floodplain as a coupled 
human and natural system, Boko Haram’s indirect impact will be felt differently by different 
groups on the floodplain according to their existing wealth, income, investments, and costs. 
Examining these variables requires a model capable of capturing the connection between 
demography and economic activities in the floodplain. 
The fields of demography and economics are increasingly dealing with the challenge of 
representing and predicting the outcomes of complex processes.  The field of demographic 
modeling faces three key challenges today: the issue of scale, the issue of dimensionality, and the 
issue of complexity. Demographic analysis has to operate across multiple scales, representing 
individuals, analytically significant collectives such as villages or regions, and for some 
applications, even entire societies. Modern demographic problems are also multi-dimensional, 
adding both uncertainty and the need to incorporate heterogeneous data sources in a single model. 
Finally, demographers must grapple with the question of how complex their models should be to 
capture the most important features of demographic processes (Silverman et al 2013). The field of 
economics has grappled with the issue of macro-micro interactions: individual people make 
decisions that alter system-level economic conditions, which in turn change the parameters within 
which individuals make decisions (Tesfatsion 2003: 264). 
 
Economics and demography have traditionally relied on statistical models that simulate aggregate 
processes; however, the emerging method of Agent-Based Modeling offers an alternative that can 
better cope with these complex problems. Agent-based models (or ABMs) retain the advantages 
of formal statistical modeling, in that their explicit assumptions lead to models of reality that can 
be readily tested and validated against empirical data (Epstein 2008). Additionally, ABMs offer 
more “natural” description of human systems by explicitly rendering individuals and their actions; 
larger scale demographic processes emerge from interactions between these individual agents and 
the model environment (Bonabeau 2002). As such, ABMs can model processes that are difficult 
to formally represent in the aggregate, including social interactions, geographical spread, nonlinear 
transitions, and stochasticity (Silverman et al 2013). In the context of this study, I chose an agent-
based modelling approach to better capture the heterogeneous nature of the floodplain’s economy: 
an agent-based model facilitates capturing diverse individual impacts on households, as well as 
their aggregate result on the floodplain economy. 
 
The model presented in this study focuses on the relationship and feedbacks between economics 
and demography at the level of the household. On the Logone floodplain, the prestige of a 
household head is directly tied to his ability to marry and support a large family (Rhebergen 1998: 
75); wealth, often stored in herds of cattle, is prized because it can pay for the ceremonies and 
expenses required for marriage (Béné et al 2000: 5). However, a large family size serves as a check 
on household wealth: more wives and children mean higher food and clothing costs each year, 
which decrease the household’s ability to marry again or invest in additional productive assets. In 
the model described below, households engage in economic activities in order to marry additional 
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wives and have more children; the needs of the additional family members then limit a household’s 
total wealth. While this relationship is adapted for the specific purposes of the Logone floodplain 
economy, its general principles could be applied to other subsistence economies that place a high 
value on family size. 
 
 
2.2 Creating the Agent-Based Model 
 
For the sake of clarity and replicability, this paper uses the updated Overview, Design concepts, 
and Details (ODD) protocol outlined by Grimm and colleagues for model description (2006; 2010). 
The model is written NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). 
 
2.2.1 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this model is to examine the impact of market collapse on the economy and 
demography of fishing households in the Logone Floodplain, Cameroon.  
 
2.2.2 State Variables and Scales 
 
The fundamental unit of this model is a fishermen household. The model is initialized with 
parameters matching the estimated population distribution and canal ownership levels in 1978; it 
then progresses in yearly time steps, with household members aging one year, undergoing 
demographic processes such as childbirth and death, receiving income from fishing and 
investments, paying for living expenses, and then making key decisions about marriage and 
investment in fish canals and/or rice fields. 
 
2.2.3 Agents 
 
A household contains one male household head, who is assigned an age. Men may marry up to 
four times, in accordance with Muslim religious law; as such, the household can contain between 
zero and four wives. The current age of each wife, as well as her age at marriage, is simulated in 
the model. The model also includes arrays containing the ages of all boys and girls in the family, 
along with an array containing the ages of widows who have joined the family after their husband 
has passed away. 
 
Each year, households earn money from fishing on the river and from tending to any canals and 
fields they may own. Households then spend money on local taxes, equipment and maintenance 
expenses, and feeding its members. Each household has an attribute called total-wealth that 
represents the total liquid assets of the household. In practice, these assets would be stored in cattle 
and small livestock (Béné 2003: 193), but for the sake of simplicity, the model represents the cash 
equivalents of the assets in the local currency, the Central African CFA franc (FCFA). 
By spending their wealth, households can purchase canals or fields to supplement their annual 
income. The household must meet certain conditions, described below, in order to purchase new 
investments. The number of canals and fields owned by each household are represented by the 
variables num-canals and num-fields, respectively. 
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2.2.4 Landscape 
 
Households exist within an idealized environment representing a section of the floodplain 
containing three major rivers: the Logone, the Lorome-Mazera, and the Logomatya. This section 
measures 21 km from East to West and 24 km from North to South, and is displayed as a raster 
with a 300 m resolution. Tiles are classified as “river,” “habitable” (less than 1 km from the river), 
“depression” (low-elevation regions filled with water, digitized from satellite imagery), and 
“background.” The eastern bank of the Logone River is located within Chad and is outside of the 
study area; no habitable tile was assigned for this region. Households can only be located within 
the habitable region of the environment, as an attempt to reproduce settlement patterns in the 
floodplain: villages tend to be located near rivers for access to water and because river banks are 
more elevated areas, so the habitations are less vulnerable to flooding damage during flood season 
(Delclaux et al 2010). 
 
Beyond the unit of the household, the model makes use of two spatial levels of aggregation. The 
first level of aggregation, the village, guides the initial placement of population and canals onto 
the floodplain. To determine the extents of different villages on the floodplain, we geolocated each 
of the survey respondents on a map of the floodplain and then aggregated these locations based on 
the respondents’ self-identified village. However, for the purpose of analysis, the model considers 
economic and demographic changes within the study area as a whole. The model also applies 
changes in costs and revenues uniformly across the floodplain. 
 
2.2.5 Input data 
 
This model uses data from three surveys conducted on the floodplain in the dry seasons of 2014, 
2015, and 2016. These surveys ranged from 9 to 15 pages long and contained numerical, multiple-
choice, and short-answer questions about the household head’s family, assets, economic activity, 
and opinions about the floodplain. In conjunction with the Modeling Regime Shifts in the Logone 
(MORSL) research group at the Ohio State University, the Center for Support to Research and 
Pastoralism (“Centre d’Appui a la Recherche et au Pastoralisme,” or CARPA) in Northern 
Cameroon carried out the surveys in each of these years. In 2014, a MORSL-CARPA research 
team surveyed a stratified random sample that included 20% of all canal owners in the study area 
(n=212). Additionally, in each village where canal owners were surveyed, the team conducted the 
same survey with an equal number of randomly-sampled non canal owners from the same village 
(n=205). The 2015 survey was conducted using a subsample of this group that contained 121 canal 
owners and 120 non canal owners. The 2016 survey was conducted for the same subsample as in 
2015. 
 
The model initializes a set number of families within each village in the study area based on 
regional government census conducted from 1975-77 that lists population by village (Office 
National de la Recherche 1978). To initialize the canals existing prior to 1978, the model 
references a survey conducted in 2014 by the MORSL-CARPA research team listing the location 
and age of each canal on the study zone. All canals greater than 36 years old (built before 1978) 
were assigned to the village closest to their locations. 
 
In addition to these surveys, the model adapts Life Tables from the World Health Organization to 
describe the lifespan of men and women across the floodplain. Life tables provide detailed 
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characteristics for different age cohorts of men and women. For each cohort, typically in a five-
year span, the table provides the probability that a member entering the age cohort will die before 
moving on to the next cohort. 
 
The model uses life tables for the Far-North Region of Cameroon from 1991, approximately 
halfway through the time period of the study. Data from the life tables are used for the entire period 
from 1978 to the present. By assuming that mortality remains fixed for all of the years within the 
cohort, we derive the annual mortality rate using Equation 1, below. 
 
R = 1 - (1 – m)^(1/n) 
 
Equation 1: Deriving annual mortality rates from life tables 
 
In this case, R is the yearly mortality rate, m is the mortality rate over the entire cohort, and n is 
the number of years in the cohort. Note that when n = 1, the yearly mortality rate is equal to the 
cohort mortality rate. Using this equation, annual mortality probabilities can be assigned for each 
of the mortality functions in the model. Death is then determined using a stochastic function. 
 
2.2.6 Initialization 
 
The model starts in the year 1978, cotemporaneous with the SEMRY project that constructed the 
Maga Dam. Based on the location and village identification of respondents from the 2014 surveys, 
the habitable region of the floodplain was subdivided into villages. Using 1975-77 survey data 
from the government of Cameroon (Office National de la Recherche 1978), I estimated the number 
of households occupying each village. The appropriate number of households were spawned in a 
random location within each village. Past research suggests that most floodplain households own 
a small plot of land that they use for subsistence farming (Béné 2003: 200; Acreman et al 2004: 
65); to account for this, each household was initialized with exactly one field. 
 
According to our 2014 survey, 267 families within the study area already owned canals in 1978. 
These canals were located in reference to the villages on the floodplain, and for each 1978 canal 
located within a village, one household in that same village is assigned a canal. All other families 
in the village begin with no canals. All households begin the model with a total-wealth of 0 FCFA. 
This allows for easy future comparison between households that have gained and lost wealth over 
time. 
 
The household head’s age, wives, and children are then initialized for each household. The 
household head’s age is determined by a random-normal distribution that differs for canal-owning 
and non-canal-owning households, based on data from the 2014 survey. A linear regression with 
a stochastic component determines the number of wives in a household based on the household 
head’s age; this regression also differs for canal-owning and non-canal-owning households. A 
function based on the number of wives and their time living in the household then determines the 
number and ages of children in the household. The process of initializing demographic attributes 
is described in more detail in a previous agent-based model of the floodplain (Henry forthcoming). 
 
2.2.7 Process overview 
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Each year, every household goes through three phases in the model: demographic changes, 
generating wealth and expenses, and choosing to spend extra wealth. At the beginning of each year, 
the household undergoes demographic changes: household members age, reproduce, leave the 
household upon entering adulthood, and die. 
 
The household then generates income for the year based on river fishing and existing investments. 
The model then calculates the total change in wealth for the year by subtracting taxes, maintenance 
and fishing costs, and the family’s cost of living from the year’s income. The household head then 
estimates his income for the next year by averaging his income for different investments over the 
past three years. 
 
Finally, the household head has the option to spend his accumulated wealth by getting married or 
purchasing a canal or field. As each of these three possibilities requires a major expenditure of 
time and labor, the household head can only choose to spend his money in one way per year. If the 
household has sufficient wealth and income to pay for a marriage and support another wife, the 
household head will get married; otherwise, depending on his wealth and other restrictions, he may 
buy another canal or field instead. Each of these yearly subroutines is described in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: The functions performed by each household on the floodplain in a given year. Functions marked 
with an asterisk are described in further detail in the following section (Subroutines) 
 
Process name Description 
update-ages The age of each household member is increased by 1. 
children-born Each wife under the age of 50 may have another child. If so, the 
child is added to the family with an age of 0. 
children-leave-household Based on their ages, children may leave the household. When 
they leave their household, boys may leave the floodplain 
altogether, start a new household in the same village, or start a 
new household somewhere else on the floodplain. Because the 
model is based on the behavior of male agents as household 
heads, women disappear from the model when they leave their 
parents’ households. They may reappear as wives, but this 
connection is not explicit in the model. 
wives-die 
widows-die 
children-die 
Family members die based on known annual mortality rates for 
their age cohort, provided by the WHO. 
head-dies Household heads die based on known mortality rates for their 
age cohort. If a household head dies, then all of the wives 
become widows. If at least one boy in the family is above the 
age of 18, he becomes the new household head and provides for 
the family; otherwise, the family members are transferred to 
another household on the floodplain.  
update-payoffs* The household’s annual payoffs for river fishing, canals, and 
fields are determined based on known distributions. 
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update-expected-payoffs The household head adjusts his expected payoffs for each 
economic activity in the following year based on known 
payoffs over the past five years. 
update-wealth* The household gains wealth from economic activity, and loses 
wealth to taxes, fees, and each family member’s cost of living 
update-expected-income* Based on the expected payoffs for each economic activity, the 
household head calculates his expected income for the next 
year. 
marriage-decision* If a household has less than four wives, has sufficient wealth to 
pay for a marriage, and has sufficient income to support another 
wife, then the household head will get married. 
investment-decision* If the household head does not get married, and other wealth 
and family conditions are met, then the household can purchase 
either an additional canal or an additional field. 
 
 
2.2.8 Subroutines  
 
Update-payoffs: Households on the floodplain can earn income by fishing in the river, growing 
food in fields, or fishing in canals. Based on data from our 2014 surveys, payoffs for river fishing 
and canal fishing were not uniform between different households. Instead, each of the activities 
followed a log-normal distribution – a distribution where the natural logarithms of the dataset 
values form a normal distribution (see Figure 1, below). In a log-normal distribution, most values 
are clustered near the low end of the spectrum, with a long right tail that encompasses a few large 
values. This type of distribution fits anecdotal evidence on the floodplain: each year, a few canals 
perform far better than the floodplain at large (Laborde forthcoming). 
 
In order to model the payoffs for river fishing and canals, the mean and standard deviation for the 
river fishing and canal fishing payoffs were determined for 2014. According to the results of a 
two-tailed probability test, non-canal owners derive a significantly higher income from river 
fishing than their canal-owning counterparts (P < 0.01). This finding also matches known data on 
the floodplain: canal owning households have to spend much of the dry season maintaining their 
canals and much of the wet season watching them, leaving household members less time for river 
fishing. The means and standard deviations for these distributions are listed in Table 2 below. 
Because the survey data does not account for inter-annual variation in profits, each household 
receives a randomly-generated income based only on their current investments, without taking 
prior income into account.  
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Figure 1: (Top) A histogram showing the distribution of river fishing revenue for non-canal owners; 
(Middle) A histogram showing the natural logarithms of the same values; (Bottom) A histogram showing 
an idealized log-normal distribution (n=10,000) with the same mean and standard deviation 
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Table 2: Means and standard deviations for canal and river fishing payoffs. Note  
that large standard deviations are common in log-normal distributions. 
Value Mean (FCFA) Std. Deviation (FCFA) 
River Fishing Payoff 
(Non Canal Owners) 
461,000 321,000 
River Fishing Payoff 
(Canal Owners) 
202,000 289,000 
Canal Fishing Payoff 571,780 556,762 
 
 
Each household receives an expected payoff for river fishing along with each investment that they 
own. The log-normal distributions are generated using a log-normal function in NetLogo, using 
Equation 2 below. 
 
 
𝛽 = ln (
µ2
𝜎2
) 
 
𝑥 = 𝑒𝑁(ln⁡(µ−𝛽/2),√𝛽) 
 
Equation 2: A stochastic function that generates a log-normal distribution given the mean and standard 
deviation of that distribution (Railsback and Grimm 2015) 
 
 
In the equation above, µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation of a log-normal distribution. 
N() is the random-normal function, and x is a random value on the log-normal distribution. 
 
According to socioeconomic survey data, a large majority (96%) of households engage in farming. 
Of these farming households, most primarily grow rice (88%), with smaller numbers growing 
millet, corn, and vegetables for personal consumption. Most household land holdings are broken 
up into parcels either 1 hectare or 0.5 hectares in area. Yearly income from agriculture is positively 
correlated with the amount of farmland owned by a household, with an increase in 1 hectare of 
land corresponding to an income increase of approximately 154,000 FCFA (see Figure 2). When 
a linear regression was created to estimate farming payoff based on farmland area, the regression’s 
residuals were approximately normally distributed (see Figure 3). In the model, payoff from 
agriculture is based on a random-normal distribution with a mean of 154,000 FCFA per hectare of 
agricultural land owned. 
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Figure 2: There is a positive linear correlation between a household’s total agricultural land holdings and 
that household’s revenue from farming. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Residuals from a linear regression that estimates annual farming income from the total area of 
a household’s agricultural land. The residuals are approximately normally distributed with a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 113,000 FCFA. 
 
 
Update-wealth: Once the household has earned a payoff from each of its activities and investments, 
it loses wealth to taxes, fees, maintenance costs, and providing for each family member. After 
subtracting annual costs from the year’s income, the difference is added to the household’s total 
wealth. 
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Canal maintenance costs, like the payoffs, follow a log-normal distribution with a mean of 169,000 
FCFA and a standard deviation of 152,000 FCFA. The annual canal maintenance costs for each 
canal are set using the log-normal function described in Equation 2. Additionally, local authorities 
extract an income tax from each of the floodplain residents: both survey data and past studies 
suggest that until recently, the tax remained constant at approximately 10% of total income for all 
floodplain residents (Acreman et al 2004: 65, Béné 2003: 202). 
 
Households must also feed and clothe their family members each year. Survey data showed a weak 
positive correlation between the number of family members in a household and that household’s 
annual food and clothing costs (see Figure 4). A cost estimate that allocated 140,000 FCFA in food 
and clothing costs for each adult (ages 12-59) in the household, 70,000 FCFA for each child (ages 
3-11), 35,000 FCFA for each infant (ages 0-2), and 70,000 for each elder (ages 60 and over) 
predicted more of the variation in household food costs than an estimate based on raw household 
size alone, so this estimate was used to predict household food costs in the model. These 
consumption estimates by age group correspond with the relative needs described by the Adult 
Consumer Equivalents (Moritz 2003: 85). However, socioeconomic surveys showed that 
approximately 5% of respondents reported skipping at least one meal per day in order to minimize 
their expenses. To account for this in the model, households whose total wealth falls below a 
certain threshold will consume only half of their predicted food and clothing costs for the year. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between the number of family members in a household and annual food and 
clothing costs. 
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Update-expected-income: Each household tracks its total income, minus maintenance costs and 
income taxes, over the past five years. This function averages those five values, taking into account 
changes in family size and new investments, to estimate the expected income in the following year. 
The household’s expected income is used to make decisions about marriage each year. 
 
Marriage-decision: A household head’s social status on the floodplain is closely linked to his 
ability to support a large family (Rhebergen 1998: 73-75). Therefore, to maximize social status, a 
household head in this model will always take another wife if it is legally permissible, he can pay 
for another marriage, and he will be able to support her in the future. 
 
In the model, these three requirements are formalized into the following constraints. In order to 
marry, a household: 
- Must have less than four wives 
- Must have an expected income great enough to support all current household members as 
well as one additional adult in the following year. 
- Must have a total wealth that is greater than the cost of marriage (including both a dowry 
and the cost of a ceremony) 
 
If these three conditions are met, then the household head will take another wife. The wife’s age 
will be generated as a function of the husband’s age at marriage (see Henry et al forthcoming). 
The household will gain one more wife, and will lose the amount of wealth equal to the marriage 
expenses. 
 
If a household satisfies the first two conditions but does not have adequate wealth to pay for 
another marriage, it will perform a calculation to estimate whether it will be able to marry next 
year. This calculation is performed by adding the household’s expected income to its total wealth, 
then subtracting expected food and clothing costs for the upcoming year. If the resulting wealth 
total is greater than the cost of marriage, then the household is likely to get married in the next 
year. In this case, a household will skip the investment-decision subroutine for the current year, as 
they are saving their wealth to get married. 
 
Investment-decision: If a household has wealth left over after paying for the year’s expenses, that 
household will determine whether or not it can invest in either of the model’s two productive assets: 
fields and canals. The household first determines its eligibility to purchase either of the two 
resources. In order to purchase another canal, the household must satisfy the following conditions: 
- The household must have sufficient wealth to pay for the canal’s construction, set by the 
variable canal-cost 
- Households must receive approval from the village chief and local elite before beginning 
canal construction; this requires that the household has achieved a certain status within the 
village community (Drijver et al 1995: 38). As a surrogate for measuring this status, the 
household’s wealth must surpass a threshold (greater than the cost of the canal) in order to 
construct the canal. This threshold is measured by the variable canal-ownership-threshold 
- Canal owners must expend significant effort maintaining their canal in the dry season and 
fishing from it during the wet season (Laborde et al forthcoming). Due to the intensive 
labor requirements, a household may own no more than two canals 
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Households also have the option to purchase a one-hectare field for farming each year. In order to 
purchase another field, the household must satisfy the following conditions: 
- The household must have sufficient wealth to purchase the field, set by the variable field-
cost 
- Due to the labor requirements for maintaining and farming a field, a household may own 
no more than three fields 
 
Households can only purchase one productive asset per year. If a household satisfies the 
requirements to purchase one type of asset but not the other, it will purchase the available asset. If 
a household satisfies the purchasing requirements for both assets, it will compare the expected 
payoffs for canals and fields (set by the update-expected-payoffs function) and purchase the asset 
with the higher expected payoff. If a household does not satisfy the requirements to purchase either 
asset, then it will move to the next year. 
 
2.2.9 Design concepts 
 
This model operates on the principle of emergence: while households make economic decisions 
based on their individual income, costs, and wealth, the model primarily measures the system-
level trends that emerge from the aggregation of those individual decisions. The total number of 
fields and canals on the floodplain, distribution of wealth, and family sizes are controlled by no 
single household, but these measures are critical for understanding the effects of economic 
disturbances on the floodplain. 
 
The model also relies on stochastic processes to determine many of the initial conditions, payoffs, 
and costs for each household. While households rely on a deterministic decision-making process 
for marriage and investments, the model’s stochasticity more accurately reflects how wealth is 
distributed within the floodplain economy, as well as range of ways that economic disturbances 
would impact individual households. 
 
Fitness-seeking behavior and prediction are two of the design concepts that characterize individual 
households. Instead of a single metric for fitness, households attempt to maximize their household 
size while still maintaining a high level of wealth, which takes the form of a large cattle herd on 
the floodplain (see Béné 2000). To accomplish this goal, households use their current knowledge 
to estimate future conditions. Households can predict whether or not they should save up money 
to get married next year; and given the choice between canals and fields, they will estimate the 
potential profitability of each by averaging payoffs from previous years. 
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2.3 Model Validation 
 
The model was validated against known system-level trends on the floodplain. Two known 
indicators, growth in canals and average family sizes, were set as the criteria for validation: 
- The number of canals on the floodplain grew at an increasing rate from 1978 to 2014 
- By 2014, the average canal-owning household had a total of 11.99 family members, and 
the average non-canal-owning household had an average of 5.96 family members 
 
The model replicated the increasing rate of growth in the number of canals on the floodplain 
between 1978 and 2014. While the model only covers a subset of the floodplain, and therefore 
overstates the total number of canals in 2014, the general trend of growth is evident. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Actual increase in canals across the entire floodplain versus the modeled increase in canals on 
a subset of the floodplain 
 
 
In terms of modeling average family sizes, the model’s results fall within the 90% confidence 
interval for family sizes of both canal-owning families and non-canal-owning families, as 
determined by our 2014 socioeconomic survey of the floodplain. The results are summarized by 
Table 3, below. 
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Table 3: The mean household sizes for canal owners and non-canal-owners as determined a 2014 
socioeconomic survey compared with the modeled result. In both cases, the modeled result falls within 
the 90% confidence interval for the actual mean household size. 
Population 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
HH Size 
90% Confidence 
Interval 
Mean HH Size 
(Modeled) 
Canal Owning Households 208 11.99 [11.28, 12.70] 11.66 
Non-Canal-Owning 
Households 205 5.96 [5.41, 6.51] 6.22 
 
 
Because the model adequately replicated the pattern of canal growth over time and fell within 
acceptable limits for average household sizes, it serves as an acceptable approximation of actual 
floodplain conditions for the purposes of the economic experiments described in the following 
section. 
 
 
2.4 Simulating Disturbances 
 
In order to understand the long-term impacts of Boko Haram on the wealth, family size, and 
investments of floodplain households, I simulated disturbances to the floodplain’s economy. I 
quantified the disturbance as a reduction in the profitability of economic activities: starting at the 
beginning of the disruption period, the income households derived from river fishing, canal fishing, 
and agriculture all decreased. As a result of this decreased profitability, the disruption reduces the 
ability of households to cover their living and maintenance expenses. After implementing the 
disturbance for a period of years, I revert the overall profitability to its original level and measure 
how important system metrics change over the following one to ten years. 
 
I simulated nine different disturbances on the floodplain economy. Income could be reduced to 
90% of its original levels (mild), 75% of its original levels (moderate), or 50% of its original levels 
(extreme); additionally, the disturbance could last for a period of one year (short), two years 
(medium), or five years (long). I began each disturbance in 1999, which allowed me to compare 
the results of even the longest disturbance (1999-2004) with data from the validated model up to 
ten years after the end of that disturbance (up to 2014). This testing timeline ensures that the 
experimental results are only tested against known, validated data on household demography and 
wealth. 
 
In total, I ran the model under 10 different sets of parameters, including the nine disturbance states 
as well as a “null hypothesis” that experiences no outside disturbance. I simulated each set of 
parameters 100 times, then averaged the values from each of those runs to obtain my final data set. 
For each run, I took measurements for 38 different metrics each year. These metrics are broken 
down in Table 4, below. 
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Table 4: Metrics measured for each run of the model 
Indicator Measurement(s) Scope(s) 
Number of households Total Count All households 
Canal owners only 
Non-canal owners only 
Number of canals Total Count Canal owners only 
Number of fields Total Count All households 
Fields per household Mean All households 
Canal owners only 
Non canal owners only 
Wives per household Mean All households 
Canal owners only 
Non canal owners only 
Number of family 
members per household 
Mean All households 
Canal owners only 
Non canal owners only 
Expected income Mean 
25th Percentile 
Median 
75th Percentile 
All households 
Canal owners only 
Non canal owners only 
Total wealth Mean 
25th Percentile 
Median 
75th Percentile 
All households 
Canal owners only 
Non canal owners only 
 
 
In the following section, I describe the results of these experiments. In the “Discussion” section 
below, I explain the meaning of these results and their implications for the floodplain. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Normal Conditions 
 
The following section aggregates results from the 100 “null hypothesis” runs of the model, which 
simulate floodplain conditions without any disturbances. In this simulation, canals, households, 
and fields all experienced sustained growth from 1978 to 2014. Households grew at an 
approximately linear rate from 1978 until approximately 2002, when yearly household growth 
increased. The rate of canal growth quickened each year from 1980 until 1985, then became 
approximately linear for the remainder of the simulation. Field growth slowed slightly in the late 
1980s, then increased again after 2000. These growth trends are charted in Figures 6 and 7; raw 
growth rates are summarized in Table 5, below.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Simulated household growth on the floodplain in the absence of economic disturbances 
 
 
Figure 7: Growing numbers of canals (left) and fields (right) on the floodplain in the absence of economic 
disturbances 
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Table 5: Sustained growth in households, canals, and fields within the “null hypothesis” model 
Stock Count (1978) Count (2014) Growth: (2014)/(1978) 
Households 2307 5175.9 2.243 
Canals 267 1091.2 4.087 
Fields 2307 9749.44 4.226 
 
 
While the numbers of canal-owning and non-canal-owning households both experience sustained 
growth from 1978 to 2014, non-canal-owning households grow at a faster relative rate. On the 
whole, both canal-owning and non-canal-owning households grow in terms of wives, family size, 
and fields from 1978 to 2014, with canal owners experience higher levels of growth in both 
absolute and relative terms. However, all three metrics stagnate or decline slightly after the year 
2000. As we shall see below, this may be due to a trend of stagnating income and increasing costs 
that begins around this time. Household growth, family size, and field investments from 1978 to 
2014 are charted in Figures 8 through 11; growth for canal owners and non-canal owners is 
summarized in Table 6, below. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Increase in the number of households in the “null hypothesis” model floodplain from 1978 to 
2014, divided by canal ownership 
  
29 
 
 
Figure 9: Change in the average number of wives per household over time in the “null hypothesis” model 
floodplain from 1978 to 2014, divided by canal ownership 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Average family size, including husband, wives, children, and widows, for households on the 
“null hypothesis” modeled floodplain 
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Figure 11: Average field ownership per household from 1978 to 2014 in the “null hypothesis” modeled 
floodplain 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of average household characteristics for canal owners and non-canal owners in the 
absence of economic disturbance, 1978-2014 
 Canal Owners (CO) Non Canal Owners (NCO) Comparison: 
CO/NCO 
Stock 1978 2014 Pct. change, 
1978-2014 
1978 2014 Pct. change, 
1978-2014 
1978 2014 
Number of Households 267 783.6 +193.5% 2040 4392.3 +115.3% 0.131 0.178 
Avg. Wives/Household 0.86 2.62 +205.5% 0.58 1.61 +178.2% 1.479 1.625 
Avg. # Family Members 6.02 11.66 +93.8% 3.92 6.22 +58.6% 1.535 1.875 
Avg. # Fields/Household 1 2.39 +139% 1 1.79 +79.4% 1.000 1.331 
 
 
Plots of mean income over time suggest that the mean incomes of all household types increased 
from 1978 until the late 1990s, then stagnated from 2000 to 2014, even falling slightly in the case 
of non-canal-owners. Individual plots showing the ranked distribution of income for all households, 
canal owners, and non-canal owners show similar trends in income over the duration of the 
simulation. Note that because expected income is derived from an average of the past five years 
of earnings, it may understate yearly variation in income. Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show plots of 
income from 1978 to 2014. 
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Figure 12: Mean expected income for different household groups on the floodplain from 1978 to 2014 in 
the absence of economic disturbances 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of expected income for all households on the floodplain from 1978 to 2014 in the 
absence of economic disturbances 
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Figure 14: Distribution of expected income for canal-owning households on the floodplain from 1978 to 
2014 in the absence of economic disturbances 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Distribution of expected income for non-canal-owning households on the floodplain from 1978 
to 2014 in the absence of economic disturbances 
 
 
Charts plotting changes in household wealth over time show the effects of stagnating income 
coupled with a larger household size. As average household size peaked in the late 1990s (see 
Figure 10) and average income stagnated (see Figure 13), it appears that more households had to 
spend their extra income on paying for family costs rather than investing in productive assets such 
as canals and fields (see Figure 11). As families continued to grow and new households appeared 
on the floodplain without inheriting assets from their parents, the average wealth of households 
decreased. Figure 16 shows the average wealth of household groups over time, while Figures 17, 
18, and 19 show distributions of wealth across various household subgroups. Differences between 
the mean and median total wealth across incomes suggest that the mean wealth is being influenced 
by a few extreme values; as a result, median wealth will be the preferred metric used in subsequent 
sections. 
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Figure 16: Mean total wealth for different groups of households on the floodplain, 1978-2014, in the 
absence of economic disturbance. Note that mean total wealth may be skewed by a few extreme outliers, 
so the figures showing wealth distributions below may be a better indicator of wealth changes for most of 
the population. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of total wealth for all households on the floodplain, 1978-2014, in the absence of 
economic disturbance 
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Figure 18: Distribution of total wealth for canal-owning households on the floodplain, 1978-2014, in the 
absence of economic disturbance 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Distribution of total wealth for non-canal-owning households on the floodplain, 1978-2014, in 
the absence of economic disturbance 
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Table 7: Changes in wealth metrics for households on the floodplain, 1983-2014, in the absence of 
economic disturbance. Note that because all households started with 0 wealth, comparing with 1983 
provides a more accurate measure of wealth change over time. 
Metric Group 1983 2014 Difference, 1983-2014 
Mean All 165,740 -110,042 -275,782 
Mean Canal owners 145,597 381,513 235,916 
Mean Non canal owners 168,276 -198,818 -367,094 
25th Percentile All -15 -73,532 -73,517 
25th Percentile Canal owners -124,674 -440,415 -315,741 
25th Percentile Non canal owners 640 -43,546 -44,186 
Median All 112,430 105,511 -6,919 
Median Canal owners 112,401 192,045 79,644 
Median Non canal owners 112,426 98,200 -14,225 
75th Percentile All 289,354 359,363 70,009 
75th Percentile Canal owners 344,149 1,129,139 784,990 
75th Percentile Non canal owners 286,038 306,425 20,387 
 
 
3.2 Economic disturbances 
 
The model was also run using 9 sets of experimental parameters that simulated economic shocks 
of varying severity and length. In this section, I discuss the effects of these shocks, which began 
in 1999, on the long-term family characteristics and assets of floodplain households. Before 
comparing the effects of the disturbances, I compared the 9 experimental results (each averaged 
over 100 runs) with the results from the “null hypothesis” before 1999, when all of the parameters 
should have been the same. I determined that there was no significant or unusual variation between 
results (all experimental results were within ±5% of the original results before 1999). 
 
In order to analyze the effects of the economic disturbances, I charted the total number of canals, 
fields, and households from 1994 until 2014. Figure 17, below, shows the total number of canals 
over time in the original simulation as well as the nine experimental simulations. The nine 
economic disturbances have an easily recognizable impact on canal stocks: while canal growth 
slows down during the economic disturbances, and slows down more dramatically for the more 
severe economic shocks, the total canal count quickly resumes its original upwards trend. Even for 
the most severe disturbance, during which income decreased by 50% for five years, canal growth 
resumes its normal rate within five years after the end of the disturbance. 
 
Figure 18, below, examines this pattern more closely by charting the change in canal growth rates 
during each of the nine economic shocks. Several trends become apparent from this figure: first, 
canal growth drops more rapidly during more severe economic downturns. However, even during 
the most severe economic downturns, floodplain residents continue to build canals. The 
downwards trend for the “extreme” set of disturbances suggests that if the disturbance continued, 
new canal growth would eventually reach zero. Finally, when each economic shock ends, the new 
canal growth rate steadily climbs back to the same rate as the undisturbed model. 
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Figure 20 shows the total number of fields in each of the 10 simulations from 1994 until 2014. The 
same stoppage in field growth is apparent throughout each economic disturbance, but field growth 
resumes its normal growth pattern even more quickly after the end of the disturbance. This may 
be due to the lower cost of fields relative to canals. 
 
Figure 21 shows the total number of households for each of the 10 simulations. There is no 
significant difference, visually or statistically, between household counts for each of the 10 
simulations as of 2014. This may indicate a time delay between the economic disturbances and 
their effect on population totals; it may also suggest that the maximum five-year duration of the 
economic shocks is still too short to impact patterns of marriage on the floodplain. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Changes in total canals as a result of nine economic shocks 
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Figure 18: Changes in annual canal growth as a result of mild (top left), moderate (top right), and severe 
(bottom) economic shocks of five durations 
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Figure 19: Changes in the total number of fields over time as the result of nine economic disturbances 
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Figure 20: No change in total households as a result of nine economic shocks 
 
 
Wealth comparisons across the ten simulations indicate dramatic short-term changes throughout 
and immediately after each of the economic disturbances, with a long-term pattern of reversion to 
the path of the undisturbed model. This is true for the mean wealth of all households (Figure 21) 
as well as diverse wealth demographics of canal-owning households (Figure 22), non-canal-
owners (Figure 23), and the population as a whole (Table 8 and Table 9). By comparing median 
wealth values for experimental simulations with the original undisturbed simulation, Table 8 
projects the effects of various economic disturbances on median household wealth years after the 
end of those disturbances. The numbers clearly demonstrate that while the disturbances cause 
significant short-term wealth losses for floodplain households, most of those losses are regained 
within 10 years after the end of the disturbance. Table 9, which examines the same trends for the 
bottom 25% of all households, displays greater short term losses: after five years of a severe 
disturbance, this subgroup is estimated to lose approximately 1 million FCFA more than they 
would have without the shock. However, the pattern of long-term reversion to the undisturbed state 
is clear. 
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Figure 21: Changes in mean wealth of all floodplain households as a result of nine economic shocks 
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Figure 22: Losses in wealth for canal owners as the result of mild (left) and extreme (right) economic 
shocks lasting five years  
 
 
 
Figure 23: Losses in wealth for non-canal owners as the result of mild (left) and extreme (right) economic 
shocks lasting for five years 
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Table 8: Differences between the median wealth of all households after experiencing an economic 
disturbance compared with the median wealth of all households in the undisturbed simulation, measured 
at four time periods after the disturbance (rounded to the nearest 10,000 FCFA) 
 
Shock Type 
End of 
Shock 
1 Year 
Afterwards 
5 Years 
Afterwards 
10 Years 
Afterwards 
Mild-1 Year -40,000 -20,000 -10,000 0 
Mild-2 Years -40,000 -30,000 -10,000 -10,000 
Mild-5 Years -80,000 -60,000 -30,000 -10,000 
Moderate-1 Year -70,000 -50,000 -10,000 0 
Moderate-2 Years -110,000 -80,000 -30,000 -20,000 
Moderate-5 Year -200,000 -150,000 -70,000 -20,000 
Extreme-1 Year -130,000 -90,000 -40,000 -20,000 
Extreme-2 Years -220,000 -160,000 -70,000 -20,000 
Extreme-5 Years -830,000 -580,000 -160,000 -50,000 
 
 
Table 9: Differences between the wealth of the bottom 25% of all households after experiencing an 
economic disturbance compared with the wealth the bottom quarter of households in the undisturbed 
simulation, measured at four time periods after the disturbance (rounded to the nearest 10,000 FCFA) 
Shock Type End of Shock 
1 Year 
Afterwards 
5 Years 
Afterwards 
10 Years 
Afterwards 
Mild-1 Year -30,000 -20,000 0 0 
Mild-2 Years -50,000 -30,000 -10,000 0 
Mild-5 Years -90,000 -70,000 -20,000 0 
Moderate-1 Year -70,000 -50,000 -10,000 0 
Moderate-2 Years -150,000 -100,000 -30,000 0 
Moderate-5 Year -350,000 -260,000 -50,000 0 
Extreme-1 Year -190,000 -130,000 -30,000 0 
Extreme-2 Years -400,000 -300,000 -70,000 -10,000 
Extreme-5 Years -1,040,000 -890,000 -250,000 -20,000 
 
 
Taken as a whole, the results demonstrate that the residual effects of short-term economic 
disturbances can remain on the floodplain for years after the end of the disturbance itself. However, 
these effects diminish over time, and no clear indicators point to the economic disturbances 
triggering a shift in the economic activities of households. These results and their implications for 
the Logone floodplain will be discussed in the following section. 
  
43 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The simulation results paint a telling, if incomplete, picture of conditions on the floodplain as a 
result of Boko Haram. The exact magnitude of Boko Haram’s impact on the floodplain will depend 
on how far fish prices drop, the duration of the price change, and the possible continuation of 
increased fees and taxation even after the threat of Boko Haram has passed; however, the model 
suggests that unless the situation on the floodplain becomes significantly worse, the system will 
return to its previous state within ten years after the disruption. In each of the nine experimental 
simulations mimicking Boko Haram’s threat to the floodplain, economic activity was disrupted 
and wealth was destroyed during the disruption, but economic activity returned to its normal levels 
within five years, household wealth converged with the undisrupted wealth trends within 10 years, 
and there was no observable impact on long-term changes to family dynamics. In other words, the 
model predicts that the system is resilient to the change wrought by Boko Haram: while the 
floodplain will still face the previous internal threats of growing canals and lowered fish stocks, 
the current crisis will not push the system over a threshold or create long-term changes in the 
floodplain system. 
 
While these conclusions seem reassuring, they must be taken cautiously as an incomplete 
representation of the entire floodplain system. By definition, no quantitative model can capture the 
myriad interactions, scales, and influences on the “panarchy” governing actual social-ecological 
dynamics on the floodplain. My quantitative model centers around a single feedback between two 
important components of life on the floodplain: economic activity and the family. As it turns out, 
this feedback serves as a negative feedback that dampens significant changes in wealth, making 
individual households resistant to economic crises like the price decrease modeled in this paper. 
To increase the size of their families, household heads must earn an annual income high enough 
to feed all existing family members, as well as to save up the money for another marriage; as a 
result, family size (the major determinant of annual costs for households) only increases slowly 
over time. However, when the household’s wealth threshold falls below a certain level, family 
members can reduce their consumption by half, significantly lowering a household’s costs without 
impacting annual income. In this way, households can quickly recover after economic crises once 
their annual income returns to normal. While this feedback may play a genuine role in disaster 
recovery on the Logone floodplain, it is only one of many feedbacks between individuals, 
households, institutions, and the environment that collectively determine the future trajectory of 
the social-ecological system. 
 
While the model’s portrayal of system resilience remains incomplete, the results also provide 
insight into the relative vulnerability of different subgroups on the floodplain. During each 
experimental simulation, the model captured the average debt load of various subgroups on the 
floodplain, their debt levels over time, and the amount of time it took them to return to zero wealth. 
A large portion of the floodplain goes into debt during the more severe and extended crisis 
simulations: for example, the model predicts that if income drops by 50% for a period of five years, 
approximately one-quarter of canal owners will exit the disturbance with more than 2 million 
FCFA (US $3,400) in debt. This amount is substantial, especially for families who have already 
reduced their consumption levels in an effort to save money. The model does not portray the 
negative consequences of debt, from compounding interest to the crushing psychological burden 
that accompanies it. For households in poverty, skipping meals to reduce costs would quickly take 
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a toll on the labor capacity of family members, making them even more vulnerable than portrayed 
in the model. For government organizations and crisis relief groups working on the floodplain, this 
model can guide them in finding which groups and individuals to target for direct aid. After all, 
any effective response to Boko Haram must confront the poverty and lack of opportunity that are 
partially responsible for the group’s genesis (Agbiboa 2013). 
 
The model discussed in this paper has applications outside of the Logone floodplain. Agent-based 
modeling techniques can offer rich insight into the fields of economics and demography, 
particularly at the intersection of those two fields. In societies where marriage and wealth and 
linked, particularly in societies that practice polygyny, population dynamics cannot be understood 
without economic analysis, and vice versa. This feedback also links to a larger conversation about 
the links between family size, status competition, and the “embodied capital” of household in many 
small-scale societies (Shenk et al 2016). This model can serve as a testable and practical tool for 
understanding these types of integrated systems that might confound traditional dynamical models. 
 
This model might also serve as the “human” component of a more integrated model of the Logone 
floodplain. Because the model’s scope is currently limited to social and wealth-generating 
behavior, it currently relies on necessary assumptions about ecological and hydrological systems 
on the floodplain. For example, the model’s current revenue functions are currently based on three 
questionnaires from 2014, 2015, and 2016; while they might approximate the distribution of wealth 
during those particular years, they cannot account for changes dating back to the beginning of the 
model in 1978. A more reliable revenue function might account for annual floodwater levels, the 
presence of nearby canals, and estimated fish stocks in the area. Not only would this provide 
households with a more accurate income each year, it could also serve as the basis for a spatially-
aware canal building function that takes current wealth, nearby canal revenues, resource dynamics 
and diffusion of innovation into account. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I explored Boko Haram’s indirect impact on the residents of the Logone floodplain 
in the Far North Region of Cameroon. The Logone floodplain has experienced large-scale 
disruptions in the past, such as the building of the Maga Dam, and is currently subjected to a 
number of internal pressures related to the rapid spread of a canal fishing technique. Now, Boko 
Haram’s presence in the Far North Region has led to an increased military presence on the 
floodplain and has burdened floodplain residents with new taxes, lower annual incomes, and even 
the threat of violence. In order to determine how these burdens might impact the long-term 
behavior of the floodplain system, I constructed an agent-based model that simulated economic 
and demographic processes on the floodplain. After validating this model against known 
floodplain socio-economic trends from 1978-2014, I conducted a series of experiments that 
simulated economic disturbances of various magnitudes and durations on the floodplain. 
 
According to the results of the experimental simulations, the economic disturbance caused by 
Boko Haram may lead many floodplain residents into debt, but it will not change the long-term 
behavior of the floodplain system. While this result comes with a series of caveats about the 
limitation of the model, it does reveal an interesting trend on the floodplain: a feedback between 
family size and income may make households resistant to dramatic changes in wealth. Additionally, 
the floodplain model can serve as the basis for a future integrated model of the floodplain, or else 
serve as the starting point for future investigations into economic-demographic interactions. 
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